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Abstract. In this paper we discuss the impact the use of IPv6 has on
remote penetration testing of servers and web applications. Several modi-
fications to the penetration testing process are proposed to accommodate
IPv6. Among these modifications are ways of performing fragmentation
attacks, host discovery and brute-force protection. We also propose new
checks for IPv6-specific vulnerabilities, such as bypassing firewalls using
extension headers and reaching internal hosts through available transi-
tion mechanisms.
The changes to the penetration testing process proposed in this paper
can be used by security companies to make their penetration testing
process applicable to IPv6 targets.
Keywords: IPv6, security, penetration testing, host discovery, transi-
tion mechanisms
1 Introduction
IPv4 address space is nearing depletion in some regions [2, 25] and adoption of
its successor, IPv6, is increasing [17]. At recent security conferences, security
researchers have discussed flaws in both the IPv6 protocol and its implemen-
tations [3, 10, 14]. Since IPv6 replaces IPv4 as network layer protocol, future
network security activities can also be subject to change. Penetration testing is
one such activity; companies that provide penetration testing services need to
know how to change their process in order to perform penetration tests on IPv6
targets.
In this paper we will answer the following question:
“How will the use of IPv6 change remote penetration testing of web-
applications and servers?”
Penetration testing can be performed in many ways, from physically breaking
into structures to social engineering attacks and the hacking of web applications.
Although there are some e↵orts [13, 27, 29] to standardize the process of pene-
tration testing, none of them is commonly accepted as such. We therefore base
our discussion on the case study of Pine Digital Security. Pine is a company in
the Netherlands that performs remote penetration testing on web applications
and servers. They use public checklists of vulnerabilities, combined with clear
defined methods to check for each vulnerability on those checklists. This results
in a penetration testing process that can be used in this research to determine
the impact IPv6 will have.
The following sub-questions will be used to answer the main question:
– What components of the current penetration testing process need to be
changed for IPv6 targets?
– What new components can be added to the penetration testing process for
IPv6 targets?
The first sub-question concerns how the current penetration testing process
is a↵ected when IPv6 is used: what components need to be modified in order to
achieve their goal, or can be removed because they become obsolete. For each
component of Pine’s penetration testing process, the performed activities are
examined to determine how they are a↵ected by a change to IPv6. This is done
by analyzing the dependencies of every action performed, to see if functions
specific to IPv4 are relied upon. A suggestion for removal from the process or
modification is made per activity that is found to be a↵ected. By following this
approach, we determine what components of the current penetration testing
process are a↵ected, but we do not discover new additions.
The second sub-question concerns what new vulnerabilities IPv6 introduces
that are not currently tested for in Pine’s penetration testing process. From
existing literature and community sources such as protocol standards, conference
presentations and weblogs, we collect documented IPv6 vulnerabilities. When
these would be applicable within the scope of penetration testing as defined in
this research (see Section 2), we propose a check for them as an addition to the
process.
In the next section, we discuss our choice of Pine as a case study and Pine’s
penetration testing process. Components of this process that should be modified
for IPv6 or can be removed are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 discusses pro-
posed additions to the process. Finally, conclusions and suggestions for future
work are presented in Section 5.
2 Backgrounds on Penetration Testing and the Case
Study
In this section we discuss our choice of case study and describe their process of
penetration testing for servers and web applications.
Pine Digital Security performs various security services to companies, among
which penetration testing. Penetration testing at Pine is described as finding
vulnerabilities in servers and web applications using checklists of vulnerability
classes, from the perspective of certain types of attackers. Most often this is the
perspective of an outsider at a remote location (somewhere on the Internet).
Vulnerabilities qualify if they can be used to compromise the confidentiality or
integrity of the protected assets. This implies that the penetration test does not
focus on availability, although exceptions are made for availability vulnerabilities
that can be exploited without large force, and that can be tested for in a non-
destructive manner.
The process of penetration testing at Pine follows the phases described by sev-
eral sources [29,32]: planning, execution, post-execution. In the planning phase,
apart from commercial activities, an assessment of the customer’s systems and
risks is made to determine the test targets and scope. Sometimes it is neces-
sary to perform host and service discovery on the target to determine the size
of the attack surface. In the execution phase, the penetration tester finds and
exploits vulnerabilities in the targets, making sure that every vulnerability on
the applicable checklists is checked for. Discovery and attack are executed in cy-
cles, as described in [28]. In the post-execution phase, the results are formulated
along with recommendations for mitigation, and are discussed with the client.
Cleaning up and quality assurance also take place in this phase.
Pine is representative as a case study of remote penetration testing of web
applications and servers. Since Pine uses public [6] checklists and the descrip-
tion of their penetration testing process is available, the impact that IPv6 will
have can be determined in a structured way. As described, the phases of Pine’s
penetration testing process follow a recognized model. The checklists have been
assembled by independent security experts with years of penetration testing ex-
perience. They contain the most prevalent security issues such as those from the
OWASP Top Ten [26] and those exploited by popular automated testing tools,
as well as lesser-known issues.
3 Impact of IPv6 on the current penetration testing
process
In this section we discuss the components of Pine’s current penetration testing
process that either need to be changed in order to be applicable to IPv6, or
become obsolete and can be removed from the process. We go through the three
phases described in the previous section, and discuss the activities that take
place. For each of these activities, we analyze its dependencies to see if it relies
on features specific to IPv4. We only discuss those items that would need change
or can be removed.
3.1 Preparation phase
In the preparation phase, little activity involving the target systems of the pen-
etration test takes place. Normally the customer will give an exact list of IP
addresses that form the scope of the penetration test. When the customer how-
ever gives a network range instead of an exact list, a scan to detect the number
of hosts in a network needs to be performed.
Host and service discovery When performing host discovery in a subnet,
all TCP ports and some UDP ports on all hosts are probed. This is done since
many hosts do not respond to various kinds of alive polls (like ping requests),
but do o↵er services on some ports. Alive detection can stop once a proof of
aliveness is received from the server. A server without firewall will respond to a
TCP connection request to a closed port by sending a TCP packet with the RST
flag set, which indicates its aliveness. However, many servers have firewalls that
are configured to ignore connection requests to all ports by default, and make
exceptions for ports that are on a whitelist. In this case, scanning will have to
continue until the first whitelisted port is probed, which will evoke a proof of
aliveness from the server in the form of a TCP packet with either the SYN and
ACK flags or the RST flag set. Scanning in this case can take very long since
the scanner cannot distinguish a lost transmission from a dropped one and has
to retry probes multiple times after waiting for a timeout.
This type of scanning is especially problematic in IPv6 networks [7, 31] be-
cause of the large IP space typically in use. The standardised netmask size for
an IPv6 subnet is 64 bits, leaving 64 bits for numbering hosts [16]. To scan those
64 bits of address space as described would take an infeasible amount of time: 28
years under conditions that favor the scanner [31]. Therefore, exhaustive scan-
ning of all addresses in the network is infeasible within the scope of a penetration
test, unless an extremely small prefix has been given.
There are alternatives to exhaustive scanning. Address information can often
be retrieved from external sources such as the Domain Name System (DNS) and
online directories. Several websites track changes in WHOIS and DNS, and map
virtual hosts to IP addresses. Other services index networks by found services.
Address information can be taken from these websites. DNS can be used in
multiple ways to find addresses. Some servers allow AXFR queries that enable
an attacker to download the whole zone. Guessing hostnames using wordlists
can also be used. When DNSSEC is used, both NSEC and its successor NSEC3
[20] o↵er possibilities to enumerate zones [4]. Additionally, the tree of PTR
records can be queried to find addresses that are in use when the nameserver
returns NOERROR for empty non-terminals. This behavior is RFC-compliant,
and implemented by most nameservers [9]. PTR records need to be configured
for this enumeration technique to work however, which is not the case in all
networks.
Furthermore, assumptions can be made about address assignment policies.
Di↵erent sources suggest that servers and routers are usually numbered through
manual assignment or DHCPv6, not using SLAAC or privacy extensions [10,
14, 21]. In fact, DHCPv6 and manual assignment are even recommended [30].
Research indicates that manual assignment is often based on sequential num-
bering, numbering with the service port (e.g. assigning an address ending in ::80
to a webserver), wordiness (using hexadecimal characters to form words) and
IPv4 addresses in IPv6 addresses. Since the focus of our host discovery is on
servers and web applications, manual assignment and DHCPv6 are expected to
be prevalent among the targets [7,14]. To find alive hosts, one could assume that
these schemes are used for assignment, and guess what other addresses are in
use. Based on given or found addresses, address ranges can be found in which
sequential numbering, hex-word, service port and IPv4-address based addresses
are in use. For each of the suggestions that this “smart guessing” algorithm
generates, alive detection needs to be performed. For a small number of sugges-
tions, traditional alive detection could be performed by scanning all TCP and
UDP ports. As the number of suggestions increases, this approach becomes less
feasible. A limited number of ports could be probed, alongside generic methods
(ICMP ping for instance).
An algorithm using the above methods for “smart guessing” cannot guarantee
to find all hosts in a network. If a host has a DNS record that is not easily
guessable or no DNS record at all, and has an unpredictable IPv6 address, it
may not be found. An early test with such an algorithm reports finding 90-95%
of servers on public networks [15]. If a guarantee is required that 100% of the
hosts have been included in the test, the only option as of yet is to require an
exhaustive list of IP addresses from the customer.
3.2 Execution phase
In the execution phase, the penetration tester attempts to hack the targets and
makes sure that each vulnerability on the checklists is checked for. Pine has
defined methods for each check, and has documented tools that can be used.
These tools are free, commercial or in-house developed. In order to use the tools
on IPv6 targets, they need to have basic IPv6 support that includes specifying
IPv6 hosts, resolving names to IPv6 addresses and transmitting data over IPv6
sockets. This is a change that a↵ects every tool used, and will not be mentioned
separately for every checklist item.
DNS information gathering In two items on the checklists, the Domain
Name System (DNS) is queried for (possibly sensitive) information. The goal is
not host discovery as was covered in the previous section, but to check if the
DNS contains information that should not be stored there, and if the nameservers
don’t leak the entire zone to attackers. These items are checked by querying the
nameservers for the domains in scope, and attempting to download the complete
zone (AXFR) or failing that, find certain hosts by guessing hostnames. Reverse
hostnames of known IP addresses are resolved as well.
A target that uses IPv6 might have nameservers that are accessible over
IPv6, and might have AAAA records in associated zones. The checklist item can
remain the same, but the procedure for testing should be changed to include
checking both the IPv6 addresses and IPv4 addresses for the nameservers, as
they might point to di↵erent systems. For all records that are resolved, both
the AAAA and A records should be queried. Reverse lookups for both IPv4 and
IPv6 addresses should be performed. Wordlists used for brute-force guessing of
system names should be updated to contain names relevant to IPv6, such as
words containing “ipv6” and the names of popular transition mechanisms such
as Teredo and ISATAP.
Fragmentation to bypass firewalls Fragmentation in IPv6 works similar to
fragmentation in IPv4. In IPv6 however, fragment information is transmitted in
an extension header that is only present when an IP packet is a fragment, and
only end nodes perform fragmentation and reassembly.
Fragmentation attacks in IPv4 have been known for years. RFC 1858 [34]
describes two attacks that can be used to bypass firewalls using fragmentation:
tiny fragments and overlapping fragments. The RFC also suggests mitigations
against these attacks.
In the case of tiny fragments, the packet that contains the first step of the
TCP handshake (SYN flag) is fragmented across two packets such that the SYN
flag, which is at the end of the TCP header, falls within the second fragment.
A firewall that tests if a packet constitutes a TCP connection request, will not
be able to judge this having just the first fragment. It is possible that no rule
will be matched, and the packet let through. The suggested mitigation against
this attack is to discard fragments smaller than a minimum size to make sure
the TCP flags always fall in the first fragment.
Overlapping fragments can be used to smuggle a connection request past
a firewall as well. The first fragment can contain a TCP header with a cer-
tain source and destination port but no SYN flag. The firewall may allow this
fragment to pass since it is not a connection request. The o↵set of the second
fragment can be tailored to cause reassembly to overwrite the flags field of the
TCP header with the data from the second fragment. In this second fragment,
a flags field could be set that includes a SYN flag. The firewall might allow the
fragment through since it is not the first fragment, while the host reassembling
the packet (and parsing the overlap in a favorable way) will read a connection
request. The suggested mitigation is to drop fragments with an o↵set value of 1,
since higher o↵sets do not cause the flags field to be overwritten.
The original IPv6 specification allows overlapping fragments. A later RFC
[19] forbids overlapping fragments, but as this is a relatively recent change, not
all implementations follow it. As for tiny fragment attacks, many IPv6 imple-
mentations accept non-last fragments smaller than 1280 bytes [3]. Additionally,
the IPv6 specification dictates that extension headers occurring any number of
times in the same packet must be parsed. This requirement can be used to fill
a first fragment with extension headers, and put the TCP header in the second
fragment. Many implementations already follow a proposed standard [12] the
specifies that all headers, including the upper layer header, must be in the first
fragment. This mitigates the tiny fragment attack, but is not the standard yet.
Other solutions to the tiny fragment problem are being discussed in [22].
When using fragmentation attacks in IPv6, extension headers can be used as
described above in addition to the known IPv4 methods.
3.3 Evaluation phase
In the evaluation phase, the report is written and discussed with the customer.
This report includes recommendations for mitigation of the found vulnerabilities.
Like the checklist items, these recommendations may have to change to achieve
their goal on an IPv6 target.
Automated attacks The recommendation made by Pine against brute-force
attacks is to implement an anti-automation measure in the form of rate-limiting
or CAPTCHA solving, based on the client’s IP address. Several items on the
checklist have this recommendation, for instance those that check for brute-
forcing user names and passwords or spamming via feedback forms.
This recommendation works in an IPv4 world where an IP address can be
assumed to identify a user, since most users have at most one address per person
at a point in time. With IPv6 however, a standard network has a 64-bit netmask
(a “/64”), and a standard end-user assignment is a multiple of that [24]. An
organization is likely to receive a /48, while a home user is more likely to receive
a /56. Since March 2011, the exact allocations are left up to the ISP and are no
longer defined in an RFC [24]. In any case, an attacker has a very large IPv6
address space compared to the IPv4 situation. Therefore, acting on a single
IP address is not enough: the attacker can change IP addresses very often to
circumvent anti-automation measures.
We suggest using a “smarter” algorithm for anti-automation measures, that
takes into account the large address space an attacker has. This algorithm is
based on “taint” actions: actions that are a trigger to the anti-automation sys-
tem, such as a failed login attempt. After a defined number of taints in a /64,
the whole /64 is blocked. Say the attacker has multiple /64 ranges, he can use
multiple to begin with, or move to the next after the first has been blocked.
Therefore, a threshold is also set for a /56, for a /48, and so on. After each taint,
the algorithm checks for all prefix sizes if its taint threshold has been reached.
If so, the prefix can be added to a blacklist.
Session hijacking Another recommendation that needs to change, is the rec-
ommendation made for web applications to allow the use of a session from only
one IP address. Pine recommends that when a session is started (a session identi-
fier is generated and sent to the user), the IP address of the user is stored on the
server along with the session. Upon each subsequent request with that session
identifier, the server checks if the IP address where the request came from is the
same as the stored IP address. If not, access to the session is denied.
With IPv6, privacy extensions [23] are often used for end-user systems [18].
The addresses that are generated have a limited preferred lifetime, which means
they are used for outgoing connections for a limited time of often only hours.
When the preferred lifetime is over, a new address is generated and the address
is not used for outgoing connections anymore.
The described behavior poses a problem for session management according
to Pine’s recommendation. A user may use di↵erent addresses for his requests
to the web application during his session, since sessions typically run for longer
than a few hours. Therefore, the IP address cannot be used to lock the user’s
session anymore. The /64 prefix in which the random addresses are generated,
remains constant in the address, but may be used by many more users. A trade-
o↵ has to be made between usability and security: if the current recommendation
is applied to IPv6, users with privacy addresses will have trouble using the web
application. If the /64 prefix is used, abuse of the session by remote attackers
is prevented, but attackers on the same LAN may still hijack the session. With
IPv4 this situation often already exists, since many networks use NAT, which
results in a network segment having one external address.
We recommend tracking the session using the /64 prefix. The measure is
for defense-in-depth: stealing of the session identifier should be made impossible
by other means such as proper output escaping to prevent Cross-site Scripting
(XSS), the use of SSL and setting proper flags on session cookies. Additionally, in
IPv4, many users share the same public IP address with the whole LAN already,
so the use of the IPv6 /64 does not o↵er less protection.
4 Additions to the penetration testing process
In this section we describe additions that should be made to the penetration
testing process, based on existing literature, protocol standards and community
sources. Proposed additions need to be within our scope of penetration testing.
As such, vulnerabilities that are specific to the LAN (such as Neighbor Discovery
and Multicast Listener Discovery vulnerabilities) are not considered, since they
cannot be abused from a remote perspective. Vulnerabilities that can only be
used for denial of service attacks and cannot be tested for in a non-destructive
manner are out of scope as well.
4.1 Using extension headers to bypass router ACLs
Extension headers in IPv6 packets are placed between the fixed-size IPv6 header
and the payload. The IPv6 standard dictates that any number of extension
headers must be processed by receiving nodes.
Most routers can enforce packet filtering policies based on Access Control
Lists (ACLs). Filters are usually composed of not only source and destination
IP address, but also TCP/UDP ports and flags. To read this information, the
router needs to read past the complete IP header in the packet, including ex-
tension headers. High-end routers achieve high throughput by implementing the
forwarding plane (where ACL checking takes place) in hardware instead of in
software. This hardware has a fixed-size view on the packet: often only the first
64, 128 or 256 bytes are evaluated to make a routing or policy decision [33].
This limited packet view can introduce a security problem. A packet can
have so many extension headers that the upper layer header is moved outside
of the view of the forwarding plane, meaning that the information required for
a policy decision is not available. Some routers choose to pass such a packet on
to the control plane, which is software-based and can handle dynamic lengths.
Others just let the packet pass [33], which provides an easy way to bypass policy
enforcement.
An addition should be made to the checklists for checking whether adding
a large number of extension headers leads to bypasses ACL restrictions as de-
scribed above.
4.2 Unintended exposure due to transition mechanisms
Various mechanisms have been defined to ease the transition from IPv4 to IPv6.
Some of these transition mechanisms provide automatic tunneling for hosts that
want to use IPv6 in an IPv4-only network. These mechanisms are either based on
existing IPv4 tunneling techniques such as IP-in-IP and GRE or encapsulating
IPv6 packets inside layer 4 protocols such as UDP.
Hosts that are not reachable by a global IPv4 address, might become globally
reachable over IPv6 by the use of these transition mechanisms. This poses a
security risk [8, 11]. An addition should be made to the checklists to check for
the reachability of hosts in the target network using IPv6 transition mechanisms.
This could be achieved by performing alive detection on guessed addresses, based
on assumptions about the transition mechanism used. Assumptions about the
addresses can be made when ISATAP, Teredo or 6to4 are in use, since these
transition mechanisms use predictable information in the IPv6 addresses that
are generated.
ISATAP ISATAP is used to provide hosts in a network with IPv6 support,
while not migrating the entire network to IPv6. The network itself must have
an IPv6 prefix routed to it, but not all infrastructure inside the network needs
to support IPv6. The IPv4 network is used as a link layer for IPv6. Hosts in the
network use the IPv6 prefix combined with their own IPv4 address v4addr to
generate an IPv6 address, that ends with the 48 bits :5efe:v4addr.
If the network prefix is known, for instance from other IPv6 enabled hosts
or a WHOIS service, the generated IPv6 addresses can be guessed based on the
IPv4 addresses that are in use. Private IPv4 addresses can even be accessed using
this method: if a host has IP address 10.0.0.2 on the LAN and it uses ISATAP in
prefix 2001:db8::/32, it will have IPv6 address 2001:db8::5efe:a00:2 (0a00:0002
is 10.0.0.2 in hexadecimal notation) which is globally reachable by default.
6to4 A host that has IPv4 address v4addr can have the prefix 2002:v4addr::/48
routed to it by setting up a 6to4 tunnel. By substituting known IPv4 addresses
of the target into 2002:v4addr::/48, prefixes are acquired wherein host discovery
can be performed.
Teredo Teredo addresses contain more variables than just the v4addr, such as
the UDP port number. By making assumptions about these variables, addresses
could be guessed. However, since there are 216 possible port numbers, one would
need to test 2
16
2 n guesses on average, where n is the number of IPv4 addresses
in use. This will very quickly become infeasible.
An addition to the penetration testing process should be made to discover
hosts reachable via the 6to4 and ISATAP transition mechanisms. Within ISA-
TAP prefixes, known IPv4 addresses and commonly used private ranges should
be tried. Within 6to4, the IPv4 addresses of border routers in the target network
should be used to generate prefixes in which host discovery can be performed.
4.3 Evading policy enforcement using routing headers
One of the IPv6 extension headers is the Routing Header (RH). There are two
types of routing headers, of which RH0 (type 0) can be used to specify a list of
addresses that should be visited by the packet.
This feature o↵ers the same functionality as the “Loose Source Route Record
(LSRR)” option in IPv4, and poses the same security risk. With RH0 enabled,
an attacker could craft a packet that follows a certain path into a network,
bypassing a firewall. Or, the destination according to the destination address
could be allowed by the firewall, while the real final destination specified inside
the RH0 header is not [1, 5]. The first destination host would then forward the
packet over the internal network.
Because of the vulnerabilities identified in the RH0 functionality, the IPv6
standard was updated in 2007 [1] to deprecate RH0 extension headers. However,
many IPv6 implementations already contained the RH0 functionality, and there
is no guarantee that all of them have been updated to reflect the change. There-
fore an addition to the penetration testing process should be made to check for
firewall bypassing using RH0 headers.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper shows that when IPv6 is used, changes to the penetration testing
process are needed. Some activities need to be performed in a di↵erent way for
IPv6 targets, and some new checks should be added to the process. None of the
activities of the current penetration testing process need to be removed from the
process.
The following elements of the process need to be changed. Host discovery by
exhaustively scanning the entire IP space will not work for normal-sized IPv6
networks. We have described an algorithm that combines di↵erent sources of
address information with assumptions about address assignment, to replace ex-
haustive scanning. DNS information gathering should be changed to also search
for IPv6 (AAAA) records, and include IPv6-specific wordlists. Fragmentation
attacks that aim to bypass firewalls should be changed to include IPv6-specific
fragmentation attacks. Recommendations for mitigation of vulnerabilities are
also a↵ected: brute-force attacks cannot be stopped by blocking single IPv6 ad-
dresses. We described an algorithm that takes into account the address space
an attacker may have. Furthermore, users cannot be expected to keep the same
IPv6 address throughout the lifetime of their session, so the user’s network prefix
must be taken into account when restricting access to the session.
Additions to the penetration testing process should be made to target several
IPv6-specific vulnerabilities. The use of IPv6 extension headers in general allows
for router ACL bypassing on some systems. If Routing Headers are allowed,
firewalls might be bypassed as well. When certain transition mechanisms are in
use, internal systems may be directly accessible to attackers. Additions to the
checklists are proposed for these IPv6-specific vulnerabilities.
Using Pine’s penetration testing process provided us with a structured way
to examine the impact IPv6 may have, but may not be applicable to penetration
testing as performed by others than Pine. As future work, the impact of IPv6
on other forms of penetration testing, such as Local Area Network penetration
testing, could be investigated. Future research could also verify our findings by
performing penetration tests on IPv6 targets with the checks and algorithms
proposed here.
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